




provides	 an	 attractive	 model	 for	 understanding	 a	 way	 that	 our	 sensory	 systems	 may	
interact.	Moreover,	 it	 has	been	 suggested	 that	 the	process	of	multisensory	 integration	
that	 it	 models	 underpins	 conscious	 experiences	 with	 multisensory	 representational	
contents	merged	 across	modalities	 (de	 Vignemont	 [2014b]).	 Should	we	 therefore	 take	
empirical	 support	 for	 the	 Bayesian	 model	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 multimodality	 of	
perception?	 Focusing	 on	 evidence	 of	 integration	 across	 vision	 and	 touch,	 I	 argue	 that	
apparent	support	for	the	model	does	not	warrant	the	rejection	of	the	view	that	each	of	














perceptual	experiences	as	being	modality-specific.	 That	 is,	our	 conscious	perceptual	experiences	
will	be	visual,	or	auditory,	or	 tactile,	and	so	 forth.	 I	will	 call	 the	view	that	each	of	our	conscious	
perceptual	experiences	is	associated	with	or	assignable	to	one	and	only	one	sense	modality	Sense	
Modalism.	
Sense	 Modalism	 is	 not	 the	 view	 that	 at	 any	 time	 we	 have	 at	 most	 a	 single	 conscious	
perceptual	experience	belonging	to	one	sense	modality.	As	 I’m	typing	on	my	keyboard	 I	 feel	 the	
keys	beneath	my	fingertips,	 I	hear	 the	tapping	sound	produced,	and	 I	 see	the	characters	appear	
before	me	on	the	computer	screen.	Moreover,	 it’s	not	simply	the	case	that	 I	seem	to	be	able	to	
perceive	a	number	of	distinct	entities,	each	through	a	distinct	sense	modality,	at	the	same	time.	I	
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one	associated	with	a	different	sense	modality.	 I	 see	the	cup,	smell	 the	coffee	brewing,	 feel	 the	
carpet	beneath	my	feet	and	hear	the	birds	singing	outside,	all	at	the	same	time.	




conception	 of	 taste	 is	 mistaken	 and	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 sense	 of	 taste	 proper,	 we	 have	 a	
distinct	way	of	perceiving	flavour,	which	combines	taste	with	retronsal	olfaction	and	touch	in	the	
mouth	(Auvray	and	Spence	[2008];	Smith	[2015]).	
But	 there	 is	 another	 way	 in	 which	 we	 can	 question	 the	 traditional	 conception	 of	
perceptual	 experience:	 by	 rejecting	 Sense	 Modalism.	 A	 number	 of	 philosophers	 have	 recently	








approach	 assumes	 what	 I	 will	 call	 the	 Independent	 Systems	 View:	 the	 view	 that	 the	 sensory	
systems	operate	entirely	independently	from	one	another.	
There	 is	now	a	 large	body	of	evidence	that	shows	that	the	Independent	Systems	View	is	
mistaken.	Here	 is	 just	a	 sample.	Cross-modal	 correspondences	are	pairs	of	apparently	unrelated	
stimuli	detected	by	different	sensory	systems	that	we	reliably	match	together	when	prompted	and	
that	 can	 influence	 our	 responses	 to	 tasks.	 For	 example,	 when	 asked	 we	 reliably	 match	 large	
objects	 with	 low	 pitch	 sounds	 and	 small	 objects	 with	 high	 pitch	 sounds.	 Gallace	 and	 Spence	













correspondence	between	pitch	 and	 size	would	 impact	 response	 times.	 The	 task	was	 to	 indicate	
whether	 the	 second	of	 two	discs,	presented	one	after	 the	other,	was	 smaller	or	 larger	 than	 the	
first.	They	 found	 that	participants	 responded	more	quickly	when	 the	second	disc	was	presented	
synchronously	with	 a	 ‘congruent’	 sound:	 a	 small	 disc	with	 a	 high-pitched	 sound,	 or	 a	 large	 disc	
with	a	low-pitched	sound.	
Neurophysiological	 studies	 in	 animals	 have	 found	 multisensory	 response	 enhancement	
and	 supression	 effects:	 that	 is,	 the	 signals	 generated	 by	 some	 cells	 in	 what	 have	 come	 to	 be	
recognised	as	multisensory	areas	of	the	brain	in	response	to	multisensory	stimulation	are	greater	
or	 smaller	 than	 the	 individual	 component	 responses	 (see	 (Stein	 and	 Meredith	 [1993])	 for	 a	
review).	
Cross-modal	 illusions	also	 show	 that	 the	 sensory	 systems	 interact	with	one	another.	 For	
example,	when	subjects	are	presented	with	spatially	discrepant	visual	and	auditory	stimulation	at	
the	same	time,	participants	mislocate	the	auditory	stimulus	in	the	direction	of	the	visual	stimulus.	
This	 is	 the	 spatial	 ventriloquism	 effect	 (Bertelson	 [1999]).	 The	 sound-induced	 flash	 illusion	 is	
another	 example	of	 a	 cross-modal	 illusion.	When	 subjects	 are	presented	with	 two	beeps	 at	 the	
same	time	as	a	single	light	flash,	around	sixty	per	cent	of	participants	report	not	only	hearing	the	
two	beeps,	but	also	seeing	two	light	flashes	instead	of	one	(Shams	et	al.	[2000]).	In	the	parchment	
skin	 illusion,	amplification	of	 the	sound	produced	when	we	rub	our	hands	 together	 results	 in	us	
experiencing	our	own	hands	to	be	drier	(Jousmaki	and	Hari	[1998]);	in	the	McGurk	Effect,	subjects	
are	presented	with	a	video	of	lip	movements	that	produce	the	phoneme	/ga/	with	the	phoneme	
/ba/	dubbed	on	to	 it,	 resulting	 in	 the	perception	of	 the	phoneme	/da/	 (McGurk	and	MacDonald	
[1976]).	
So	much,	then,	for	the	Independent	Systems	View	(Briscoe	[2016],	p.	1).3	Is	the	evidence	








There	 are	 a	 number	of	ways	 to	 go	 about	 arguing	 for	 the	multimodality	 of	 conscious	perceptual	
experience.	One	 line	 of	 argument	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 some	 of	 the	 properties	 and	 the	
objects	we	perceive	can	be	perceived	through	more	than	one	sense	modality.	So,	for	example,	we	











both	 see	 and	 touch	 the	 cup.	 However,	 when	 we	 try	 to	 capture	 what	 conscious	 perceptual	
experience	or	experiences	I	have	in	this	situation,	there	seem	to	be	at	least	two	possibilities.	We	
might	 think	 that	 I	 have	 a	 visual	 experience	 that	 represents	 the	 cup	 and	 it’s	 size	 and	 I	 have	 a	






least	 may	 on	 occasion	 be—a	 single	 representation	 of	 that	 property/object.	When	my	 eyes	 are	










I	hear	Tim	say	“bonjour”	and	 I	 see	his	 lips	moving,	 shaping	 the	word	“bonjour.”	Both	modality-





For	 de	 Vignemont,	 then,	 integrative	 binding	 produces	 multimodal	 experiences	 with	 unified	
contents. 4 	We	 can,	 I	 think,	 understand	 this	 as	 the	 claim	 that	 integrative	 binding	 produces	




receptor	 sends	 noisy	 signals.	 Furthermore,	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 signals	 can	 be	 decreased	 by	
environmental	conditions	(poor	light,	for	example,	or	noisy	environment).	It	is	thus	important	to	
have	more	 than	one	source	of	 information.	 Informational	 redundancy	 increases	 robustness	and	
reliability.	Thanks	to	integrative	binding,	the	perceptual	system	can	generate	the	best	estimate	of	
the	 property	 of	 the	 object	 by	 pondering	 and	 integrating	 the	 various	 sources	 of	 information.	
([2014b],	p.	132)	
	
As	 we	 will	 see	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 integrative	 binding	 has	 all	 the	 hallmarks	 of	






















from	 these	 studies	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 our	 perceptual	 systems	 are	 optimal	 Bayesian	 decision	
makers.	
In	what	 follows,	 I	 aim	 to	 assess	whether	 these	 empirical	 studies	 provide	 support	 for	 de	
Vignemont’s	 claim	 that	 perceptual	 experiences	 can	 be	multimodal.	 I’ll	 focus	 on	 one	 study	 that	
examines	the	integration	of	visual	and	haptic	information.	My	aim	is	to	show	that	we	should	not	
assume	 that	 the	 sensory	 systems	 integrate	 information,	 and	 nor	 should	 we	 assume	 that	 any	
integration	 of	 sensory	 information	 that	 does	 take	 place	 sub-personally	 is	 in	 the	 service	 of	
multisensory	perceptual	experience.	
In	 doing	 so,	 I	 do	 not	 set	 out	 to	 offer	 a	 defence	 of	 Sense	Modalism.	 Indeed,	 doing	 so	 is	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	not	 least	because	there	are	many	other	ways	of	arguing	for	the	
multimodality	 of	 conscious	 perceptual	 experience.	 For	 example,	 it	 has	 been	 claimed	 that	 we	
perceive	particular	objects	to	bear	a	number	of	properties,	each	of	which	 is	perceptible	through	
one	 sense	 modality	 only	 (Nudds	 [2014];	 O’Callaghan	 [2014a];	 Bayne	 [2014];	 de	 Vignemont	
[2014b]).	Casey	O’Callaghan	 ([2017])	has	argued	that	our	perception	of	 feature	 instances	can	be	
multimodal	 when	 aspects	 of	 the	 feature	 happen	 to	 be	 perceptible	 through	 different	 sense	
modalities	on	that	particular	occasion,	say	in	cases	of	intermodal	motion	perception	or	intermodal	
rhythm	perception.	O’Callaghan	([2017])	has	also	argued	that	particular	kinds	of	property	that	we	






experience.	 In	what	 follows,	 therefore,	 I	 aim	 to	 assess	whether	 some	 recent	 empirical	work	 on	
multisensory	 integration	 provides	 any	 support	 for	 the	 philosophical	 claim	 that	 perceptual	







with	 which	 to	 understand	 many	 of	 the	 multisensory	 effects	 we	 have	 observed.	 For	 example,	
Sensory	 Combination	 describes	 interactions	 between	 sensory	 signals	 in	 different	 coordinate	
systems,	or	between	sensory	cues	to	different	properties	of	 the	same	object	 (Ernst	and	Bülthoff	
[2004],	 p.	 163).	 Multisensory	 Integration,	 by	 contrast,	 in	 these	 cases	 picks	 out	 interactions	
between	sensory	cues	to	the	same	properties	of	the	same	object.5	
While	the	different	sensory	systems	process	lots	of	information	about	different	properties	
and	objects,	 there	 is	 also	 some	overlap.	The	 sensory	 systems	 receive	multiple	 cues	 to	 the	 same	
properties	of	the	same	objects.	This	redundancy	of	 information	 is	 found	within	a	sense,	but	also	
across	 the	 senses:	 for	example,	both	 the	visual	 system	and	 the	auditory	 system	process	 cues	 to	
spatial	 location.	 If	 the	source	of	an	audible	sound	 is	seen,	 then	the	sensory	systems	will	process	
both	visual	and	auditory	information	about	the	location	of	the	sound	source.	
Sensory	 neurons	 have	 receptive	 fields.	 That	 is,	 each	 neuron	will	 be	 activated	 by	 stimuli	
that	fall	within	a	particular	region	of	space	relative	to	the	perceiver.	A	flash	of	light	in	front	of	you	
will	evoke	a	response	in	the	neurons	whose	receptive	fields	include	the	location	of	the	light	flash.	













the	 cup:	 one	 measurement	 of	 4	 cm	 and	 one	 measurement	 of	 5	 cm.	 If	 I	 integrate	 the	 two	
measurements,	 I	 average	 the	 two	 values	 to	 produce	 the	 mean	 measurement	 of	 the	 height.	
Assuming	the	two	measurements	are	weighted	equally,	the	result	will	be	4.5	cm.	
The	 value	 of	 integration	 is	 that	 it	 can	 improve	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 sensory	 estimates	
produced.	According	to	a	popular	model	for	combining	or	integrating	redundant	information	from	
more	 than	 one	modality,	Maximum	 Likelihood	 Estimation	 (MLE),	 our	 sensory	 systems	 integrate	
information	optimally,	as	determined	by	the	Bayesian	approach	to	decision	making.	That	 is,	they	
produce	the	most	reliable—the	most	likely—estimate	of	the	way	things	are	in	the	world	given	the	











than	 the	 second	 measurement.	 When	 I	 integrate	 my	 two	 measurements	 together	 I	 take	 the	
relative	reliabilities	of	each	measurement	into	account,	assigning	the	first	a	weight	of	0.75	and	the	
second	a	weight	of	0.25.	In	this	case,	I’ll	integrate	the	measurements	to	give	a	value	of	4.25	cm.	
MLE	 models	 the	 best	 or	 optimal	 way	 to	 combine	 redundant	 information	 because	 it	
produces	 a	 sensory	 estimate	 with	 the	 least	 variance	 and	 hence	 the	 greatest	 reliability.	 If	 the	
system	is	able	to	measure	reliability	well,	improving	reliability	will	improve	accuracy.	According	to	




particular	 cross-modal	 illusions,	 in	 terms	 of	multisensory	 integration	 (Briscoe	 [2016],	 p.	 123;	 de	
Vignemont	[2014b],	p.	131;	Bayne	[2014],	p.	21).	The	idea	here	is	that	multisensory	integration	as	
modelled	 by	MLE	will	 only	 be	 advantageous	 if	 the	 sensory	 cues	 that	 are	 integrated	 are	 in	 fact	
redundant.	That	 is,	 it	will	only	be	advantageous	if	the	sensory	signals	are	derived	from	the	same	
object	or	event.	However,	the	suggestion	goes,	things	can	go	awry—that	is,	cues	that	should	not	
be	 integrated,	 are	 integrated—leading	 to	 cross-modal	 illusions.	 In	 the	 ventriloquism	 effect,	 for	
example,	 it’s	 suggested	 that	 information	 about	 the	 location	 of	what	 is	 heard	 is	 integrated	with	
information	about	the	location	of	what	is	seen,	even	though	what	it	is	that	is	seen	and	what	it	is	
that	is	heard	are	distinct	entities.7,	8		





presented	bi-modal	stimuli	 is,	 for	example,	 larger,	or	farther	away.	 In	giving	a	model	of	why	 it	 is	
that	 participants	 choose	 the	 stimulus	 they	 choose	 on	 each	 of	 the	 trials,	 the	 proponent	 of	MLE	


















personal	 process	 (although	 of	 course,	 and	 as	 I	 shall	 argue,	 this	 need	 not	 be	 a	 perceptual	
phenomenon).	
Moreover,	 in	 discussions	 of	MLE	we	 frequently	 find	 references	 to	multimodal	 percepts.	
For	 example,	 Angelaki	 and	 colleagues	 introduce	 the	MLE	model	 by	 stating	 that	 ‘a	 fundamental	
aspect	 of	 our	 sensory	 experience	 is	 that	 the	 information	 from	 different	 modalities	 is	 often	
seamlessly	 integrated	 into	 a	 unified	 percept’	 (Angelaki	 et	 al.	 [2009],	 p.	 452).	 The	 sentiment	 is	
echoed	by	other	leading	figures	in	the	MLE	literature:	
	
To	 perceive	 the	 external	 environment	 our	 brain	 uses	 multiple	 sources	 of	 sensory	 information	
derived	from	several	different	modalities,	including	vision,	touch	and	audition.	All	these	different	





We	 perceive	 our	 own	 body	 and	 the	 world	 surrounding	 us	 via	 multiple	 sources	 of	 sensory	
information	 derived	 from	 several	 modalities,	 including	 vision,	 touch	 and	 audition.	 To	 enable	


















and	 the	 visual	 components	 of	 the	 stimuli	 independently	 of	 one	 another.	 This	meant	 that	 there	
could	 be	 differences	 between	 the	 visual	 and	 haptic	 height	 of	 the	 ‘same’	 bi-modal	 stimulus.	 For	
example,	on	the	same	trial,	the	stimulus	could	have	a	visual	height	of	60	mm	and	a	haptic	height	
of	50	mm.	






What	 Ernst	 and	 Banks	 were	 interested	 in	 finding	 out	 was	 at	 what	 height	 the	 uniform	
stimulus	had	to	be	for	a	discrepant	stimulus	with	a	visual	height	of	60	mm	and	a	haptic	height	of	
50	mm	 to	 be	 judged	 to	 be	 the	 same	 size.	 This	 could	 be	 assessed	by	 finding	 at	what	 height	 the	
uniform	stimulus	had	to	be	for	subjects	to	judge	it	to	be	taller	than	the	discrepant	stimulus	on	50%	
of	trials.	They	called	this	the	point	of	subjective	equality	(PSE).	
Why	were	they	 interested	 in	 this?	They	asked	subjects	 to	perform	the	same	task	 in	 four	
different	 conditions.	 In	 one	 condition	 the	 noise	 of	 the	 information	 was	 not	 experimentally	
manipulated.	In	the	other	three	conditions	they	introduced	visual	noise	at	levels	of	67%,	133%	and	
200%	by	increasing	the	blurriness	of	the	visual	stimulus.	
This	meant	 that	 they	 could	 look	at	 the	difference	 in	 the	PSE	 in	each	condition,	 to	 see	 if	
differences	in	the	reliabilities	of	the	visual	and	haptic	information	relative	to	one	another	had	any	
impact	on	how	tall	subjects	judged	the	discrepant	stimulus	to	be.	




the	reliability	of	 the	visual	 information	 is	greater	than	the	reliability	of	 the	haptic	 information,	 it	
will	 be	 given	 a	 greater	 weighting	 in	 the	 averaging	 process.	 As	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 visual	
information	drops	relative	to	that	of	the	haptic	information,	it	will	be	given	an	increasingly	smaller	
weighting	in	the	averaging	process.	
Hence,	 the	Bayesian	model	 predicts	 that,	 as	 Ernst	 and	Banks	 increased	 visual	 noise	 and	













FC)	 tasks	 were	 used	 by	 Battaglia	 et	 al.	 ([2003])	 and	 by	 Alais	 and	 Burr	 ([2004])	 to	 investigate	











the	visual	and	auditory	 locations	of	 the	discrepant	stimulus,	but	closer	 to	 its	visual	 location.	The	
PSE	 differs,	 though,	 depending	 on	 the	 level	 of	 visual	 noise,	 in	 line	with	 the	 predications	 of	 the	
Bayesian	 MLE	 model.	 Shams	 et	 al.	 ([2000])	 tested	 numerosity	 judgements	 with	 sequences	 of	




So,	MLE	 seems	 to	 be	backed	up	by	 results	 from	psychophysics.	What	 should	we	 conclude	 from	
these	 predictive	 successes?	 MLE	 is	 a	 model	 of	 cue	 integration:	 it	 stipulates	 the	 way	 in	 which	
sensory	information	should	be	integrated,	and	so	is	a	model	of	information	processing.	Ernst	and	





cases,	 combine	 multisensory	 signals	 in	 the	 manner	 predicted	 by	 the	 MLE	 approach.	 (Briscoe	
[2016],	p.	123)	
	








integrated	 within	 a	 sense	 when	 there	 is	 redundant	 sensory	 information	 available—say,	 when	
there	 are	 multiple	 cues	 to	 depth	 within	 vision.	 However,	 the	 experiments	 mentioned	 above	
indicate	 that	 participants	 behave	 as	 predicted	 when	 presented	 with	 redundant	 but	 discrepant	
sensory	 information	 in	 two	different	sensory	systems.	That	 is,	we	seem	to	have	evidence	of	cue	
integration	not	only	within	a	sense,	but	also	across	the	senses.	
On	this	basis	 it	might	be	tempting	to	conclude	that	conscious	perceptual	experience	can	
be	multimodal,	 at	 least	 in	 so	 far	 as	 redundant	 information	 from	multiple	 sources	 is	 integrated	
across	sensory	systems	to	produce	single	multimodal	perceptual	contents.	We	have	evidence	that	
supports	 MLE.	 If	 we	 combine	 this	 with	 de	 Vignemont’s	 proposal	 that	 the	 processes	 that	 MLE	
models	are	processes	that	produce	multisensory	perceptual	contents,	then	we	might	be	tempted	
to	 conclude	 that,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 not	 always	 or	 even	 commonly	 the	 case,	 conscious	 perceptual	
experience	can,	on	occasion,	be	multimodal.	Hence	Sense	Modalism	should	be	abandoned.	





personal	 level	 perceptual	 contents	 to	 sub-personal	 informational	 states,	 I	 don’t	 think	 that	 the	
empirical	evidence	forces	us	to	reject	Sense	Modalism.	
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In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 I	 will	 examine	 whether	 the	 psychophysical	 experiments	





The	 first	 thing	we	should	note	 is	 that	 results	 from	MLE	experiments	are	consistent	with	at	 least	
two	 different	 kinds	 of	multisensory	 interaction.	We	 can	 think	 of	 the	 sensory	 systems	 impacting	




but	 one	 that	 is	 tokened	 multiple	 times	 in	 more	 than	 one	 sensory	 system.	 Call	 this	 interaction	
Modulation.10	
O’Callaghan	 ([2017])	 argues	 that	 cross-modal	 perceptual	 illusions	 such	 as	 the	 spatial	
ventriloquism	effect	and	the	rubber	hand	 illusion	can	be	explained	 in	 terms	of	mechanisms	 that	
recalibrate	and	coordinate	 responses	across	 the	senses	 ([2017],	p.	158).	Cross-modal	perceptual	
illusions	 indicate	 that	 the	 sensory	 systems	 perform	 conflict	 resolution,	 but	 conflict	 resolution	
doesn’t	require	that	representations	be	shared	between	the	senses.	Resolution	of	conflict	can	be	





the	 direction	 of	 the	 visible	 object.	 But	 this	 need	 not	 require	 that	 the	 sensory	 systems	 have	
generated	 a	 single	 multimodal	 representation	 of	 an	 object,	 or	 of	 its	 location.	 We	 can	 equally	
explain	the	effect	in	the	following	way.	The	sensory	systems	encode	a	set	of	rules	that	specify	pairs	
of	 outputs	 that	 should	 be	 produced	 in	 response	 to	 pairs	 of	 inputs.	 The	 visual	 system	processes	





only.	 But,	 even	 though	 stimulation	 to	 one	 sensory	 system	 seems	 to	 shape	 our	 perceptual	
experiences	associated	with	another	 sensory	 system	 (O’Callaghan	 [2017],	p.	 159),	our	 conscious	
perceptual	experiences	can	still	each	be	associated	with	one	and	only	one	sense	modality.	
There	might	be	other	kinds	of	mechanism	that	could	be	classed	as	versions	of	Modulation.	







interaction.	 Integration	 functions	 to	 produce	 a	 single	 token	 perceptual	 representation	 of	 the	
property,	 while	 Modulation	 produces	 two	 or	 more	 token	 representations	 of	 the	 same	 type.	
Notice,	 though,	 that	 nothing	 else	 about	 the	 two	 mechanisms	 need	 be	 different.	 They	 can	 be	
subject	 to	 the	 same	 influences	 and	 sensitive	 to	 differences	 in	 the	 reliability	 of	 incoming	
information.	 In	 other	words,	 they	 both	 can	 instantiate	 optimal	 Bayesian	 decision-making	 in	 the	
face	 of	 uncertainty,	 weighting	 the	 contributions	 of	 different	 sensory	 cues	 to	 the	 production	 of	
their	estimate	according	to	the	relative	reliability	of	each	cue.		
The	problem	for	the	opponent	of	Sense	Modalism	is	that,	as	long	as	we	are	asking	subjects	
to	 perform	 a	 2I–FC	 task	 in	 which	 they	must	 judge	 which	 of	 two	 bi-modal	 stimuli	 is	 the	 larger,	
Integration	and	Modulation	will	produce	the	same	behavioural	responses.	For	ease	of	exposition,	
I’ll	 characterize	 the	 content	 of	 a	 perceptual	 experience	 of	 the	 height	 of	 the	 stimulus	 with	 a	
numerical	value,	‘58	mm’,	say.	According	to	Integration,	when	participants	in	the	experiment	have	
discrepant	 visual	 and	 haptic	 information	 about	 the	 size	 of	 the	 stimulus	 that	 is	 integrated	 to	
produce	an	estimate	of	it	as	being	58	mm	tall,	they	have	a	visuo-haptic	experience	of	the	stimulus	
with	 a	 content	 ‘58	 mm’.	 By	 contrast,	 according	 to	 Modulation,	 the	 result	 of	 the	 multisensory	
interaction	 will	 be	 a	 visual	 experience	 with	 a	 content	 ‘58	 mm’	 and	 a	 haptic	 experience	 of	 the	
stimulus	with	a	content	‘58	mm’.	Whether	the	mechanism	involved	in	the	multisensory	interaction	
is	Modulation	or	 Integration,	 subjects	will	 still	 judge	another	stimulus,	which	 they	experience	as	
being	64	mm	tall,	to	be	the	larger.	
We	 therefore	 cannot	make	 substantial	 conclusions	about	 the	nature	of	 the	mechanisms	
involved	in	multisensory	processing	on	the	basis	of	the	psychophysical	evidence	so	far	produced	in	
support	 of	 MLE.	 The	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 Bayesian	 model	 is	 evidence	 of	 sensitivity	 to	 the	
noisiness	 of	 sensory	 signals,	 and	 the	 optimal	 weighting	 of	 that	 information	 in	 subsequent	
interactions.	As	 long	as	a	modulatory	mechanism	of	 the	kind	 I’ve	 called	Modulation	 can	explain	
the	behavioural	results	as	well	as	 Integration	can,	we	don’t	have	evidence	that	tells	decisively	 in	





challenge	 to	 Sense	Modalism	 is	 that	 there	 are	 limits	 to	what	we	 can	discover	 about	 perceptual	
experience	 using	 psychophysical	 experiments.	 Bayesian	 accounts	 of	 perception	 are	 concerned	
with	perceptual	‘decisions’—that	is,	with	the	production	of	sensory	estimates	on	the	basis	of	cues	
within	 perceptual	 processing.	 So,	 what	 the	 model	 predicts	 is	 what	 perceivers	 should	 have	
experienced	 when	 presented	 with	 the	 visuo-haptic	 stimuli.	 It	 assumes	 that	 changes	 in	 the	




haptic	 information	 available,	 as	 its	 relative	 reliability	 improves.	 Judgements	 conform	 to	 the	
predictions	made	by	the	Bayesian	model.	But	this	means	that	what	the	experiments	actually	probe	
is	 how	 subjects’	 perceptual	 judgements	 change	 as	 the	 relative	 levels	 of	 noise	 in	 two	 sensory	
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systems	is	manipulated.	How,	then,	can	we	be	sure	that	the	integration	occurs	within	perceptual	
processing,	 rather	 than	post-perceptually,	 in	 the	making	of	 the	 judgement	about	which	stimulus	
was	larger?	
Proponents	 of	 the	 Bayesian	model	 have	 sought	 to	 address	 this	 question	 by	 looking	 for	
evidence	 of	 metameric	 behaviour.	 Perceptual	 colour	 metamers	 are	 colour	 stimuli	 that	 have	
different	spectral	compositions	but	are	perceived	by	observers	 to	be	 identical	 to	one	another	 in	
certain	luminance	conditions.	What	the	exponent	of	the	Bayesian	model	wants	to	find	is	evidence	
that	subjects	are	similarly	unable	to	discriminate	between	differently	sized	stimuli.	The	reasoning	
is	 as	 follows.	 If	 sensory	 information	 about	 a	 property	 is	 integrated	 to	 give	 a	 single	multimodal	
representation	of	that	property,	then	any	stimulus	with	visual	and	haptic	heights	that	average	to	
55	 mm	 will	 be	 perceptually	 indistinguishable	 from	 any	 other	 stimuli	 whose	 visual	 and	 haptic	
heights	also	average	 to	55	mm,	 regardless	of	differences	between	 the	visual	heights	of	 the	 two	
stimuli	 and	 between	 the	 haptic	 heights	 of	 the	 two	 stimuli.	 These	 stimuli	 will	 be	 perceptual	
metamers	of	one	another.	So,	Ernst	says:	
	
[.	 .	 .]	 if	 two	cues	are	 totally	 fused	at	 the	perceptual	 level,	 the	same	percept	will	 result	whether	
they	 both	 indicate	 a	medium	 value,	 or	 they	 differ	 radically	 from	one	 another	 but	 average	 to	 a	
medium	value.	[…]	If	cues	are	fused	it	should	be	obvious	that	also	discrimination	performance	will	
be	 affected.	 Along	 the	 fused	 dimension	 [.	 .	 .]	 discrimination	will	 remain	 possible.	 However,	 for	
stimuli	 not	 being	 along	 this	 dimension	 discrimination	 will	 drop	 and	 it	 will	 be	 impossible	 to	













While	 there	 is	 (some)	evidence	of	metameric	behaviour	 for	cues	within	a	modality,	 they	
didn’t	 find	an	effect	 in	the	cross-modal	condition.	What	should	we	conclude	from	these	results?	
The	results	do	not	look	promising	for	the	proponent	of	multimodality.	Losing	individual	uni-modal	





forced	 fusion’—in	 which	 information	 will	 always	 be	 integrated	 and	 access	 to	 the	 individual	
estimates	 is	 lost—and	 ‘partial	 fusion’—in	 which	 information	 is	 integrated,	 but	 access	 to	 the	
individual	uni-modal	sensory	estimates	is	retained.	That	is,	Ernst	argues	that	metameric	behaviour	
is	 not	 even	 a	 necessary	 consequence	 of	 integration.	 Hence,	 we	 can	 explain	 the	 failure	 to	 find	
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solve	 not	 one,	 but	 two	 ‘multisensory’	 problems.	 They	must	 establish	 how	 to	 integrate	 sensory	
information	 from	more	 than	 one	 source—that	 is,	 they	must	 determine	 the	 reliabilities	 of	 each	
sensory	estimate	if	they	are	to	integrate	information	in	conformity	with	the	principles	of	MLE.	But	
first	 they	 must	 establish	 when	 sensory	 information	 should	 be	 integrated.	 That	 is,	 they	 must	
determine	when	sensory	information	is	redundant:	when	information	is	about	the	same	property	
of	 the	 same	object.	 This	 is	 known	 in	 the	 literature	under	 several	 different	 names,	 including	 the	
Causal	 Inference	 Problem	 (for	 example,	 Shams	 and	 Beierholm	 [2010])	 or	 the	 Correspondence	
Problem	(for	example,	van	Dam	et	al.	 [2014]).	The	Bayesian	model	of	cue	 integration	solves	 the	
problem	by	 postulating	 a	 coupling	 prior:	 a	 prior	 specifying	 the	 likelihood	 that	 information	 from	
two	sources	concerns	the	same	property	of	the	same	object.11	
Partial	 fusion	 has	 been	 postulated	 as	 the	 response	made	 when	 the	 coupling	 prior	 that	
specifies	that	the	likelihood	that	sensory	information	is	redundant	falls	below	a	certain	threshold.	
When	 there	 is	 such	 uncertainty	 about	 whether	 the	 two	 pieces	 of	 information	 have	 the	 same	
source,	 the	 system	 doesn’t	 ‘fully’	 integrate.	 That	 is,	 visual	 information	 influences	 auditory	
processing,	and	auditory	information	influences	visual	processing,	but	the	outcome	is	not	a	single	
multimodal	 perceptual	 experience	 of	 the	 location	 of	 some	 entity.	 Rather,	 the	 multisensory	
interaction	produces	two	distinct	experiences	with	distinct	representational	contents.12	
Partial	fusion	has	thus	commonly	been	invoked	to	explain	results	in	which	the	presence	of	
information	 in	 one	 sensory	 system	 influences	 the	 processing	 of	 sensory	 information	 in	 another	
sensory	system	(see,	for	example,	Shams	and	Beierholm	[2011];	Bayne	[2014]).	Take,	for	example,	
a	 typical	 study	 of	 spatial	 ventriloquism,	 in	which	 subjects	 are	 asked	 to	 locate	 the	 source	 of	 the	




Notice	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 partial	 fusion	 seems	 to	 be	 very	much	 akin	 to	 the	mechanism	
Modulation,	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 In	 both,	 what	 is	 perceived	 in	 one	 modality	 is	
changed	as	a	result	of	what	is	perceived	by	means	of	the	other	modality,	though	both	modalities	
are	 experienced.	 The	 difference	 between	Modulation	 as	 introduced	 there	 and	 partial	 fusion	 as	













representational	 contents	 that	assign	 the	same	 value	 to	 the	 same	object,	as	 it	 is	 in	Modulation.	
Rather,	partial	fusion	produces	two	token	representational	contents	that	assign	different	values	to	
the	objects	represented	in	each	modality.		
Claiming	that	there	 is	partial	 integration,	understood	in	this	way,	 in	cases	where	there	 is	
uncertainty	about	whether	information	concerns	the	same	property	of	the	same	object	allows	us	
to	argue	that	subjects	still	have	distinct	 (and	discrepant)	visual	and	haptic	experiences	of	 the	bi-
modal	 stimulus.	 This	 might	 be	 used	 to	 explain	 why	 Hillis	 and	 colleagues	 found	 no	 metameric	
behaviour	in	their	cross-modal	condition.		
Yet,	an	account	of	the	results	 in	terms	of	partial	 integration	does	nothing	to	support	the	
view	 that	perceptual	experiences	have	multimodal	 representational	 contents.	Partial	 integration	
produces	two	perceptual	representational	contents,	and	not	one	multimodal	content.	
Moreover,	the	results	found	in	the	study	do	not	give	us	reason	to	favour	an	explanation	in	
terms	 of	 partial	 integration	 over	 the	 absence	 of	 perceptual	 integration.	 Subjects	 were	 able	 to	





An	 alternative	 view,	 according	 to	 which	 integration	 is	 post-perceptual—that	 is,	 it	 is	 an	
effect	we	 find	when	 subjects	make	 judgements	 about	 a	 property	 of	 an	object	 in	 the	world	 and	
their	 perceptual	 experiences	 have	 representational	 contents	 that	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 one	
another—seems	equally	well	placed	to	explain	both	the	results	found	in	the	3-interval	oddity	task	




I’ve	 described	 two	 different	 multisensory	 mechanisms:	 Integration	 and	 Modulation.	 For	 the	
proponent	of	MLE	to	convince	us	to	abandon	Sense	Modalism	she	needs	to	show	that	the	kind	of	
mechanism	 involved	 in	 the	 integration	of	 sensory	estimates	 is	 Integration.	 Yet	 the	experimental	




Ernst	 suggests	 that,	where	 there	 is	 discrepant	 redundant	 sensory	 information	 available,	
that	 information	 must	 ‘converge	 to	 a	 single	 multimodal	 percept’	 in	 order	 for	 us	 to	 be	 able	 to	










There	are	a	number	of	problems	with	 this	 reasoning,	principal	 amongst	 these	being	 the	
assumption	 that	 any	 process	 of	 integration	 that	 could	 be	 required	 in	 order	 for	 us	 to	 act	
successfully	 must	 be	 in	 the	 service	 of	 perception.	 If	 we	 accept	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 argument	 that	
Integration	is	required	for	successful	action,	it’s	nevertheless	possible	that	this	integration	process	
occurs	independently	from	conscious	perception.	
Our	 ordinary,	 everyday	 assumption	 is	 that	 action	 is	 guided	 by	 conscious	 perceptual	
experience.	On	this	assumption,	the	specification	of	a	particular	spatial	property	that	guides	action	
will	 be	 a	 component	 or	 part	 of	 the	 content	 of	 perceptual	 experience.	 However,	 the	 claim	 that	
action	 is	 guided	 by	 conscious	 perceptual	 experience	 has	 come	 under	 attack	 in	 recent	 years.	
Specifically,	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 fine-grained	 details	 of	 motor	 actions	 requiring	 consistent	
representations	 of	 spatial	 properties	 are	 guided	 by	 conscious	 perceptual	 experience	 has	 been	
challenged.	We	 have	 neurophysiological	 evidence	 from	macaques	 with	 lesions	 in	 the	 dorsal	 or	
ventral	 streams	 (Ungerleider	 and	 Mishkin	 [1982])	 and	 from	 neurological	 patients	 with	 visual	
agnosia	 and	blindsight	 on	 the	one	hand	or	 optic	 ataxia	 on	 the	other	 hand	 (Goodale	 and	Milner	
[1992];	Milner	 and	Goodale	 [2006]),	 as	well	 as	behavioural	 evidence	based	on	 the	 responses	of	
healthy	human	 subjects	 to	 illusory	 stimulation	which	 together	provides	 support	 for	 a	 functional	
division	between	two	streams	of	processing	in	the	visual	system.	Based	on	this,	it’s	been	claimed	
that	 there	 is	 a	 functional	 division	 between	 processing	 in	 the	 dorsal	 stream	 ‘for	 action’	 and	
processing	 in	 the	ventral	 stream	 ‘for	perception’.	 Further	evidence	has	been	 taken	 to	 support	a	
division	of	labour	between	sensory	processing	for	conscious	perception	and	sensory	processing	for	
action	 in	 the	 auditory	 system	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Arnott	 et	 al.	 [2004])	 and	 the	 somatosensory	
system	(for	example,	Dijkerman	and	de	Haan	[2007]).	
The	 distinction	 between	 sensory	 processing	 ‘for	 perception’	 and	 ‘for	 action’	 calls	 into	
question	 the	 idea	 that	 sensory	 information	 must	 be	 integrated	 so	 as	 to	 produce	 a	 conscious	
sensory	 experience	 with	 a	 single	 multimodal	 perceptual	 content	 in	 order	 for	 us	 to	 be	 able	 to	
perform	world-directed	bodily	actions	successfully.	That	 is,	even	 if	our	capacity	 to	act	depended	
on	producing	a	weighted	average	of	discrepant	information	from	different	sources,	there	may	be	






stimuli	 in	 a	 task	 in	 which	 subjects	 merely	 gave	 a	 verbal	 report	 about	 where	 the	 stimuli	 were	
located	with	performance	in	a	mislocalization	task	in	which	subjects	were	required	to	point	to	the	







Of	course,	 the	possibility	that	some	 instances	of	 integration	occur	within	the	stream	‘for	
action’	 does	 not	 preclude	 the	 possibility	 that	 other	 instances	 of	 integration	 occur	 within	 the	
stream	 ‘for	 perception’.	 For	 example,	 Fisher	 and	 Pylyshyn	 hypothesise	 that	 ‘visual/auditory	
matching	 in	 motor	 performance	 behaves	 differently	 from	 matching	 for	 cognitive	 perception,	
implying	 that	 the	 “two	 visual	 systems”	 hypothesis	may	 be	 better	 described	 as	 “two	 perceptual	
systems”,	and	suggesting	that	at	least	two	cross-modal	localization	modules	may	exist’	(Fisher	and	
Pylyshyn	[1994],	p.	95).	
What	 is	more,	 dual	 sensory	 processing	 system	 theories	 are	 controversial.	 But,	we	 don’t	
need	to	maintain	 that	 there	 is	a	 functional	division	between	different	processing	streams	within	
each	of	 the	 sensory	 systems	 in	order	 to	deny	 that	 the	performance	of	 successful	motor	 actions	
shows	 that	 conscious	 perceptual	 experience	 is	multimodal.	 This	 is	 because	we	 need	 not	 accept	
that	 successful	 motor	 action	 requires	 Integration.	 We’ve	 already	 examined	 Modulation	 as	 an	
alternative	way	 in	which	discrepancies	 in	 the	 information	 in	different	 sensory	 systems	might	be	
resolved.	There	are	also	other	ways	 in	which	a	single	specification	of	a	spatial	property	could	be	
reached	 or	 decided	 upon.	 For	 example,	 such	 a	 specification	 might	 be	 reached	 by	 deriving	
information	about	the	relevant	property	from	one	sense	only	(Nudds	[2014]).	If	I	have	discrepant	
visual	and	auditory	information	about	the	location	of	a	bird	and	I	want	to	point	to	it,	I	can	base	my	
pointing	 on	 the	 visual	 information	 only,	 or	 on	 the	 auditory	 information	 only.	 I	 don’t	 have	 to	








The	 empirical	 sciences	 continue	 to	 generate	 evidence	 about	 the	 operations	 of	 the	 sensory	
systems.	Amongst	other	 things,	 they	show	us	that	 these	systems	 interact	with	one	another,	and	
that	these	interactions	result	in	behavioural	effects.	
One	model	of	 some	of	 these	multisensory	 interactions	 that	has	 received	a	 good	deal	of	
attention	 in	 recent	years	has	been	 the	Bayesian	model	of	MLE,	which	models	 the	 integration	of	
sensory	 information.	 This	 is	 a	 model	 at	 the	 sub-personal	 information	 processing	 level.	 De	
Vignemont	 ([2014b])	 suggests,	 though,	 that	 MLE—or	 integrative	 binding—will	 produce	 unified	
multimodal	 contents	 at	 the	 personal	 level.	 The	 empirical	 evidence	 produced	 in	 support	 of	MLE	
might,	 then,	 be	 taken	 as	 support	 for	 the	 claim	 that	 conscious	 perceptual	 experiences	 can	 be	
multimodal.	
In	 this	 paper	 I	 have	 sought	 to	 argue	 that	 it	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	 think	 that	 these	
empirical	 studies	offer	 support	 for	 the	claim	that	conscious	perceptual	experiences	have,	or	can	
have,	multimodal	perceptual	contents.	Focussing	on	MLE	across	vision	and	touch,	I	have	examined	
a	 particular	 study	 conducted	 by	 Ernst	 and	 Banks,	 designed	 to	 test	 their	model	 of	multisensory	
integration.		
When	it	comes	to	multisensory	integration	across	vision	and	touch,	I	have	suggested	that	
we	 have	 evidence	 that	 our	 judgements	 conform	 to	 the	 predictions	made	 by	 the	 Bayesian	MLE	
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model,	 but	 this	 doesn’t	 provide	 any	 conclusive	 proof	 that	 sensory	 information	 is	 integrated	 to	
produce	a	multimodal	perceptual	content.	
This	 does	 not	 mean	 the	 empirical	 project	 of	 establishing	 that	 humans	 conform	 to	 the	
predictions	 made	 by	 the	 MLE	 model	 is	 not	 a	 valuable	 one.	 Neither	 does	 it	 mean	 that	 the	
perceptual	systems	do	not	weight	sensory	information	in	accordance	with	MLE.	But	it	does	mean	
that	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 produced	 in	 support	 of	 Ernst	 and	 Banks’	model	 does	 not,	 by	 itself,	
occasion	 any	 kind	 of	 revision	 to	 a	 philosophical	 account	 of	 our	 ordinary	 view	 of	 conscious	
perceptual	experience,	namely	Sense	Modalism.	To	reject	Sense	Modalism,	we	must	look	to	other	
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